## Contents

### Part I: History

2. Hume: Projectivist, Realist, and Error Theorist 21
   2.1. Hume's Metaethics: Descriptive and Revisionary 24
   2.2. Two Objections: Hume's Friendly Attitude to Virtue and the Motivating Power of Moral Judgement 35
   2.3. Moral Error Theories: Hume's and Mackie's 39

3. Hägerström: Projectivist, Non-Cognitivist, and Error Theorist 43
   3.1. Some Background 44
   3.2. Hägerström's Early and Later Metaethical Views 46
   3.3. Tegen's Critique 56

4. Other Precursors of Moral Error Theory 61
   4.1. Russell 62
   4.2. Wittgenstein 64
   4.3. Robinson 68
   4.4. Mackie in 1946: the Argument from Relativity 72

### Part II: Critique

5. How to Understand Mackie's Argument from Queerness (I) 79
   5.1. The First Queerness Argument: Supervenience 88
   5.2. The Second Queerness Argument: Knowledge 100
   5.3. The Third Queerness Argument: Motivation 103

6. How to Understand Mackie's Argument from Queerness (II) 116
   6.1. The Fourth Queerness Argument: Irreducible Normativity 117
   6.2. In Defence of the Conceptual Claim 126
   6.3. Queerness and Companions in Guilt 135

7. Debunking Moral Belief 139
   7.1. A Moorean Argument 139
   7.2. A Debunking Response 141
Part III: Defence

8. Ramifications of Moral Error Theory
   8.1. Error Theory and Hypothetical Reasons
   8.2. Error Theory and Reasons for Belief
   8.3. Error Theory and Deliberation

9. Moral Error Theory, and Then What?
   9.1. Against Moral Abolitionism
   9.2. Against Moral Fictionalism
   9.3. The Case for Moral Conservationism

References
Index